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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMPLOYEES' FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS BEYOND THEIR WORK SPACE: THE EMPLOYMENT RELA­
TIONSHIP AS A SOURCE OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only 
be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions 
for the security of person and property should be liberally con­
strued. A close and literal construction deprives them of half 
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right ... .1 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following situation. Police enter the office build­
ing of XYZ Corporation without a search warrant and without con­
sent. The building is not open to the general public; access is 
primarily limited to employees. The police seize items from Jane 
Doe's office on the second floor and from another room on the 
third floor. These items are later used as evidence to indict Doe on 
criminal charges. 
Doe is likely to argue that the items were illegally obtained in 
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights2 and cannot be intro­
duced into evidence at her trial. Before Doe can seek the remedy 
of the exclusionary rule? she must first meet certain requirements 
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­

fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­

tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 

things to be seized. 

Id. 
3. The exclusionary rule is a remedy available to the court when a Fourth 
Amendment violation has been established and which results in the inadmissibility of 
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to establish a constitutional violation. Doe must establish that the 
rooms searched were places in which one could have a "legitimate 
expectation of privacy."4 More specifically, she must demonstrate 
that the search and seizure violated her Fourth Amendment rights, 
as opposed to those of her employer or another employee.s This 
latter criterion is often referred to as establishing "standing" to as­
sert a constitutional violation.6 
Doe is likely to be able to establish standing with respect to the 
search of her own office.? However, her ability to establish stand­
ing with respect to the search of the room beyond her office may 
prove more difficult. ~ variety of factors, such as whether other 
employees have access to that room or whether Doe's work estab­
lishes some connection to that room, may be relevant to the court's 
decision.8 
This Note examines the issue of what establishes the basis 
upon which an employee may assert a Fourth Amendment claim 
when police conduct a search beyond her own workspace.9 The Su­
the illegally obtained evidence at trial. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 
171 (1969). The rule was originally established for evidence obtained by federal offi­
cials in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1914) and later extended to state 
officials in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The fundamental purpose of the 
rule is to deter illegal police conduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1974) (stating that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved"). 
4. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
5. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86 (1980) (stating that the defendant 
must show that he is a "victim of an invasion of privacy") (quoting Jones v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)). 
6. See infra note 60 for an explanation of standing and the distinction between 
the constitutional requirement and the judicially created requirement imposed by the 
Supreme Court for Fourth Amendment claims in particular. In Rakas v. Illinois, the 
Court expressly rejected a separate standing analysis and stated that it merged into the 
substantive Fourth Amendment analysis. 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). The courts, how­
ever, have continued to use the phrase to encompass the issue germane to this Note. 
See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 
299, 305 (1st Cir. 1980); Tobias v. IndianCl, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. 1985); State v. 
Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996). 
7. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (holding that a Union official had 
standing to object to a search of his office); United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 650 
(2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the defendant may have had standing to object to a search of 
his office). 
8. See infra Part II for a discussion of the factors relied upon by the courts in 
addressing this issue. 
9. This Note solely addresses government searches pursuant to criminal investiga­
tions. It does not address other problems that emerge when the government as em­
ployer conducts searches. See Don Mayer, Workplace Privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment: An End to Reasonable Expectations, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 625, 645-63 (1992) 
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preme Court has not precisely addressed this issue, although peti­
tions for certiorari have been filed on several occasions to resolve 
the question. lO The Court has, however, through case law address­
ing workplace-related issues, set forth certain fundamental princi­
ples relevant to the inquiry.u Guided by these principles, the lower 
courts have developed their own criteria to answer this question. 
Part I begins by examining how the Supreme Court has ad­
dressed two questions central to resolving the issue in this Note: (1) 
to what degree is the workplace a locus in which one can have pri­
vacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment, and (2) 
what establishes the basis upon which an employee may assert a 
claim? In particular, this section analyzes Mancusi v. DeForte,12 the 
Supreme Court case that most directly addresses an employee's pri­
vacy expectations in a workplace environment shared with other 
employees. Part II then discusses two approaches the lower courts 
have developed in light of the principles articulated by the Supreme 
Court. These approaches address the specific issue of an em­
ployee's right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim in searches be­
yond her workspace. Some of these courts have applied a "totality 
of circumstances" test, using the same multi-factor approach they 
apply in non-workplace contexts. Several other courts have devised 
an approach specific to the workplace context, focusing on whether 
the employee can demonstrate a "nexus" between her workspace 
and the area searched. Part II then addresses a recent Tenth Circuit 
decision, Anderson v. United States, 13 in which the court discusses 
the competing merits of the two approaches. 
Part III argues that both approaches fail to recognize how the 
employment relationship provides a basis for privacy expectations. 
This section contends that the collaborative nature of work and the 
legal obligations that arise from this relationship establish a basis 
for shared privacy rights between employer and employee. Part III 
and Heather L. Hanson, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really 
Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REv. 243, 262-74 (1993), for a discussion of the issues 
arising in workplace searches conducted by government employers. 
10. See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the defendant had standing beyond workspace), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999); 
United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant did 
not have standing in search of subordinate's office), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990); 
United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that the defendant did not 
have standing in search of storage area), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). 
11. See infra Part I for a discussion of the Court's approach to workplace privacy 
and an employee's right to assert a claim. 
12. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
13. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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also examines how the courts have, in non-workplace contexts, re­
lied on relationships as a basis for establishing Fourth Amendment 
rights. This Note contends that courts recognize the employment 
relationship as a source of Fourth Amendment rights for several 
reasons: to protect people in a place in which they spend a signifi­
cant portion of their time, to deter unwarranted government intru­
sion, and to halt a disturbing trend towards using commercial 
relationships as a basis for eroding Fourth Amendment rights be­
yond the workplace. Finally, Part IV suggests an analytical model 
that recognizes the employment relationship as a basis for Fourth 
Amendment rights but· which also encompasses established Fourth 
Amendment limiting principles to allow for legitimate police 
intrusions. 
I. 	 WORKPLACE PRIVACY & AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO ASSERT 
A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
The fundamental inquiry in any Fourth Amendment claim is 
"whether the disputed search ... has infringed an interest of the 
defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to pro­
tect. "14 To answer this question the courts often focus on two fac­
tors. The first is whether the place searched was one in which a 
person could have a legitimate expectation of privacy. IS The courts 
have afforded varying degrees of Fourth Amendment protection 
depending upon the nature of the location in which the search takes 
place.16 If one were to envision a spectrum, places such as open 
fields would fall at one end, where no protection is affordedp while 
one's own home would be at the opposite end, where the courts 
traditionally have afforded the highest level of constitutional pro­
14. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). 
15. Ia Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that 
the Fourth Amendment protects places rather than people. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
The location, however, continues to be relevant for purposes of determining whether a 
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place. See, e.g., Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (concluding that a search in an open field does 
not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy expectations); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 
559, 563 (1927) (suggesting there is no expectation of privacy for a motorboat on high 
seas). 
16. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) ("An expectation of privacy 
in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation 
in an individual's home."); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 ("We have on numerous occasions 
pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.") (citations omitted). 
17. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
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tection.18 Consequently; in determining an employee's right to as­
sert a Fourth Amendment claim, it is important to determine where 
the workplace falls along this spectrum. 
The second factor is whether the person asserting the claim has 
a legitimate basis for asserting a claim.19 The party asserting the 
claim must have been "aggrieved" by the search-a victim of the 
search as opposed to one who is incidentally harmed by a search 
directed at another.20 In order to make this determination, the 
court examines the claimant's relationship to the place searched 
and the item seized.21 This inquiry is especially critical for employ­
ees, where documents belonging to the employer are often the tar­
get of a workplace search.22 
Part I.A discusses how the courts have historically viewed the 
degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded in the work­
place. It also examines limitations imposed on that protection due 
to the public or highly regulated nature of certain businesses. Next, 
Part I.B examines the evolution of the Court's approach for deter­
mining whether a person has been "aggrieved" by a search. This 
section highlights the Mancusi v. DeForte23 decision in which the 
Supreme Court addressed an employee's right to assert a claim 
18. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106-07 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting "the unique importance of the home - the most essential bastion of privacy 
recognized by the law"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting "the 
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our tradi­
tions since the origins of the Republic"). 
19. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (noting that the Katz decision instructs the courts 
that Fourth Amendment protection depends upon "whether the person who claims the 
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place"). 
20. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (distinguishing between 
one who is a victim of a search and thus, aggrieved, as opposed to one who is not 
targeted by the search and incidentally prejudiced), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Salvucci overruled the automatic standing 
part of the Jones decision. See 448 U.S. at 85-86, 95. The other part, the "legitimately 
on the premises" test, was overruled by Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. However, the factual 
setting in Jones would still satisfy the current Fourth Amendment standard of "legiti­
mate expectation of privacy." See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43; see also Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1990) (noting that "the Rakas Court explicitly affirmed the 
factual holding in Jones "). 
21. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148 (holding that the defendants' claim must fail since 
"[t]hey asserted neither a property nor possessory interest in the [place searched], nor 
an interest in the property seized"). 
22. See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that most cases that discuss employee standing involve seizure of work-related docu­
ments from the workplace). 
23. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
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where he had neither property rights in the item seized nor exclu­
sive use of the area searched. 
A. Fourth Amendment Protection in the Workplace 
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not ex­
pressly refer to workplaces, the Supreme Court has long held that 
commercial, as well as residential, premises fall within the Amend­
ment's scope.24 In one of the earliest cases to address the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that business papers must 
be afforded the same protection as personal papers.25 The Court 
recently noted that "[a]s with the expectation of privacy in one's 
home, such an expectation in one's place of work is 'based upon 
societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the 
Amendment.' "26 
For some time the courts failed to make any meaningful dis­
tinction between the constitutional protection afforded in a home 
and a place of business.27 Eventually, two important distinctions 
emerged. The first was that businesses, unlike homes, might be 
open generally to the public.28 The second was that businesses tend 
to be subject to many more government regulations than residential 
premises.29 Both of these distinctions impact the degree of Fourth 
Amendment protection one can expect in a workplace. 
24. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 
387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
25. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (calling the invoices that 
the defendant was compelled to produce "private papers" and, thus, within the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment). 
26. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984». 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (discussing the 
authority to search one's home or place of business); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 
298,305-06 (1921) (discussing the "security and privacy of the home or office"), over­
ruled in part by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
28. This distinction is relevant not only for traditional workplaces, but any place 
in which privacy is not possible due to the public nature of the place. See, e.g., Oliver, 
466 U.S. at 179 (open fields); United States v. Brandon, 599 F.2d 112, 113 (6th Cir. 
1979) (used car lot); State v. Herbest, 551 A.2d 442, 444 (Me. 1988) (reception area of 
hospital emergency room); Commonwealth v. Adams, 341 A.2d 206, 210-11 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1975) (bus terminal); cf Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection."). 
29. See See, 387 U.S. at 545-46 (noting that businesses may reasonably be subject 
to more inspections than homes). 
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1. Public/Private Distinctions 
While the Fourth Amendment requires that no warrants be is­
sued without probable cause, no such warrant requirement applies 
to enter premises that are open to the public.3D The courts have 
held on these grounds that police could accept a general public invi­
tation to enter a business, albeit for reasons unrelated to the busi­
ness's purpose, without a warrant.31 Because the public invitation 
creates the warrant exception, courts may limit this exception to 
hours that the business is open to the public32 or to those portions 
of the premises open to the public.33 
Likewise, an officer is "entitled to take note of objects in plain 
view."34 Some courts have limited the plain view doctrine so that 
the warrant exception applies only when police view objects within 
the premises as a member of the public would.35 Consequently, the 
30. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4(b) (3d ed. 1996) (noting that various police investigative 
conduct is permissible without warrants where the premises are open to the public). 
31. E.g., United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1975) (per curiam); 
see, e.g., Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413 (1984) (public lobby of motel 
and restaurant); Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1355 
(5th Cir. 1979) (real estate office); Cantizano v. United States, 614 A.2d 870, 873 (D.C. 
1992) (per curiam) (mail courier office); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 895, 897 
(Ky. 1971) (furniture store); State v. Lund, 409 So.2d 569, 570 (La. 1982) (bar); Sullivan 
v. Dist. Court, 429 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. 1981) (cafeteria in hospital); State ex reI. 
Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals, 588 N.E.2d 116, 124-25 (Ohio 
1992) (bookstore). 
32. E.g., United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Commercial 
establishments do not extend an implicit invitation to enter during nonbusiness hours or 
when there are no employees on the premises."); see also Wilson, 475 S.W.2d at 898 
(locker accessible at any time). But see United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1168 
(7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the defendant had no Fourth Amendment claim where 
police gained entrance through a "technical trespass" after hours since he knowingly 
left the item in a place open to the public). 
33. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 271 A.2d 435, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) 
(holding that "the rear room was not visible from [other parts of the store], and the 
incursion to the rear room in the course of a thorough search of the whole first floor ... 
was plainly not justified on the theory of store premises open to the public"). 
34. Berrett, 513 F.2d at 156; see Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) 
(finding no search where an officer purchased magazines from an adult bookstore and 
then examined them to see if they were obscene); People v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 
Rptr. 507, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding no search where officer picked up a type­
writer in a pawnshop to view the serial number); State v. Cockrum, 592 S.W.2d 300, 303 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no search where officer examined serial numbers on appli­
ances for sale in store). 
35. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,329 (1979) (holding that the 
government official had conducted a search in an adult bookstore where he viewed 
films without paying for them as a customer would be required to do); see also Winters 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 F.3d 848, 854 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the police 
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degree of access by the public may limit a business owner's, as well 
as any employee's, right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. 
2. Closely Regulated Industries 
Almost all businesses are subject to some form of government 
regulation.36 These regulations may include health and safety 
codes, licensing requirements, or record keeping requirements. It 
was not until 1967 that, in a pair of decisions, the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of whether government regulations would 
reduce privacy expectations to such a degree that search warrants 
might not be constitutionally required.37 
In those cases, the defendants were prosecuted for refusing to 
allow city officials to conduct inspections pursuant to safety ordi­
nances; one setting was residentiaP8 and the other was commer­
cial.39 The Court held that "administrative entry, without consent, 
upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to 
the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical 
force within the framework of a warrant procedure."40 The Court 
noted, however, that there might be more situations in which it is 
reasonable to inspect a business than a private home and that the 
reasonableness of these inspections must be addressed on a case­
by-case basis.41 
Subsequently, the Court began to carve out exceptions to war­
rant requirements for industries that had a history of government 
oversight.42 The Court eventually expanded the exception to en­
compass "closely regulated" industries,43 regardless of whether 
there was a history of oversight.44 In New York v. Burger,45 the 
conducted a search when they demanded that the clerk produce a ring described in the 
pawnshop record even though the ring was located in a display case). 
36. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.s.C. §§ 651-71 (1998). 
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541 (1967). 
38. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 527 (housing code inspection of residence). 
39. See See, 387 U.S. at 541 (search pursuant to fire code enforcement). 
40. Id. at 545. 
41. See id. at 546. 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (gun dealer); Colon­
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor licensee). 
43. Interestingly, the expansion to "closely regulated" businesses came out of a 
case in which the Court held that an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
provision violated the Fourth Amendment. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 
324-25 (1978). 
44. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,605-06 (1981)(rejecting the length of time of 
the oversight and instead focusing on "the pervasiveness and regularity of the federal 
regulation" with regard to a search at a stone quarry); see also New York v. Burger, 482 
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Court set some boundaries on these exceptions by establishing a 
three-part test for determining whether warrantless inspections of 
these businesses are reasonable.46 Most importantly, the test re­
quired specific statutory authorization for inspections to "provid[ e] 
a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."47 
The Burger Court had noted that "[a]n expectation of privacy 
in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a 
similar expectation in an individual's home."48 The Tenth Circuit 
later explained that a reduced expectation of privacy in the work­
place is important for Fourth Amendment purposes in two ways.49 
First, it "may justify a statutory authorization of warrantless ... 
searches."50 Second, it may "affect the type of evidence that consti­
tutes probable cause to obtain a search warrant. "51 
Consequently, the fact that a search is conducted on commer­
cial premises does not automatically result in reduced Fourth 
Amendment protection.52 The public nature of a business may af­
fect privacy expectations and thus, limit protection. Likewise, a 
business may be closely regulated and put on sufficient notice of 
government oversight so that Fourth Amendment protection is 
limited. 
B. An Employee's Right to Assert a Fourth Amendment Claim 
Like Fourth Amendment claims in other settings, courts ana-
U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (finding that a warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated 
business may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
45. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
46. Id. at 702-03. The test required: 1) the regulation must be informed by a 
substantial government interest; 2) warrantless inspections must be necessary to carry 
out the regulatory purpose; and 3) a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant 
must be specified in the statute's inspection provision in terms of certainty and regular­
ity of its application. Id. 
47. Id. at 703 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603) (noting 
that the statute must be sufficiently defined to put a business on notice that it is subject 
to inspections and that the inspector's discretion must be limited in time, place, and 
scope). 
48. /d. at 700. 
49. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 597-98 n.6 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing 
privacy expectations in a commercial setting); accord Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. 
Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (comparing entry onto commercial 
versus private premises). 
50. Leary, 846 F.2d at 597 n.6 (emphasis added). 
51. Id. at 597-98 n.6 (citing Blackie's House ofBeef, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1216-17 n.5). 
52. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., 659 F.2d at 1216 n.5 (stating that except in rare 
instances, a warrant is as necessary to support a search of commercial premises as pri­
vate premises). 
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lyzed early workplace cases by focusing on property rights.53 The 
right to suppress evidence was linked to the right to seek the return 
of one's own property. 54 Therefore, if a person did not have owner­
ship, she could not be "aggrieved" by a search and seizure. 55 Cor­
porations were considered "persons" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment and, thus, could assert claims as property own­
ers.56 Corporate shareholders, however, could not assert a claim 
without an interest independent of the corporation's right.57 
Eventually the courts expanded the scope of Fourth Amend­
ment protection to include persons with possessory as well as pro­
prietary interests.58 However, the court maintained that a claimant 
had to have a personal basis for asserting a claim.59 The courts ana­
lyzed this expanded basis for asserting a claim under the rubric of 
"standing."60 A non-corporate employee could establish a suffi­
53. Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1937) (discussing the defendants' 
property rights with respect to telegrams seized); Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 
290, 293 (3d Cir. 1937) (rejecting the defendants' claims because they had no property 
rights); see Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, 
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 309-27 (1998) (discussing the Su­
preme Court's transition from its property-based inquiry to the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test in Fourth Amendment claims). 
54. See Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) ("The power to sup­
press the use of evidence unlawfully obtained is a corollary of the power to regain it."). 
55. Until 1972, the term "aggrieved persons" was the phrase used in the Federal 
Rules for parties who were entitled to make motions for the return of property seized 
and motions to suppress. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). The rule was subsequently di­
vided and section (f), which now addresses motions to suppress, no longer uses the 
term. See id. at 41(f). 
56. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (hold­
ing that a corporation has a right against unlawful search and seizure of its property). 
57. Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (hold­
ing that an officer and sole shareholder of a corporation had no right to assert a Fourth 
Amendment claim where corporate records were seized). "When a man chooses to 
avail himself of the privilege of doing business as a corporation, even though he is its 
sole shareholder, he may not vicariously take on the privilege of the corporation under 
the Fourth Amendment. . .. Its wrongs are not his wrongs; its immunity not his immu­
nity." Id. 
58. Proprietary interest is the interest of an owner of property including various 
rights that the owner has by virtue of his ownership. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
816 (7th ed. 1999). Possessory interest is the right to exercise control over property to 
the exclusion of others but it need not be through title to the property. See id. at 1185. 
59. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973) (stating that "[fjourth 
Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may 
not be vicariously asserted") (citations omitted). 
60. The term "standing" may be used to refer to two different requirements. See 
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1991). One is a constitutionally 
based requirement found in the phrase "case or controversy" in Article III of the Con­
stitution. Id. A party asserting a constitutional challenge "must allege such a personal 
stake or interest in the outcome . . . as to assure the concrete adverseness which 
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cient interest to have standing if her office was searched and her 
work papers were seized.61 Employees who did not have such in­
terest and were merely unlucky enough to be present when police 
seized incriminating evidence did not have a sufficient basis upon 
which to assert a c1aim.62 
Beginning in 1960, the Supreme Court began a major shift in 
Fourth Amendment analysis. In Jones v. United States ,63 the Court 
rejected the idea that property law should control a person's ability 
to establish standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.64 
Art[icle] III requires." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n.2 (1978). The constitu­
tional standing requirement is primarily used to determine whether a party has the right 
to bring a private suit. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 103 
(1998). The party bringing suit must show injury in fact - a concrete and actual or 
imminent harm, causation - a sufficient connection between the plaintiff's injury and 
the defendant's conduct, and redressability - a likelihood that the relief available 
through the court will redress the injury. Id. Since Fourth Amendment claims are 
raised in criminal cases, where the personal stake element is readily apparent, the con­
stitutional requirement is met. LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3, at 117. 
The second requirement, judicially created, is used specifically in Fourth Amend­
ment claims to address a party's basis for asserting a claim. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 669. 
The fact that Fourth Amendment "standing" is a judicially created requirement is 
evinced by the Rakas Court's rejection of this component as a separate inquiry in 
Fourth Amendment claims. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 n.2 (making a distinction between 
the two standing components). 
61. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932) (distinguishing 
searches of one's office for evidence, like papers, from searches to find stolen goods); 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1931); Gouled v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 298, 308-13 (1921) (seizing papers). 
62. See, e.g., Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1937) (holding 
that "unless the defendants claim the ownership of the property seized ... they have no 
constitutional rights to object to its production in evidence and have no standing in 
order to avail themselves of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment"); United 
States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811, 811 (2d Cir. 1933) (per curiam) (finding that a work­
man in occupancy but not dwelling on the premises did not have interest in the property 
seized or the premises searched and had no right to assert a claim); Connolly v. 
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that a night watchman did not have 
possessory rights because those rights remained with his employer and therefore, he 
could not assert a claim). 
63. 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 
448 U.S. 83 (1980). See supra note 20 for the current importance of the Jones case after 
Salvucci was decided. 
64. Id. at 261 (extending the exclusionary rule to avoid requiring defendants to 
claim ownership of narcotics in order to obtain protection against the illegal search). 
The Court found: 
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the con­
stitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle dis­
tinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of 
private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has 
been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical . . .. Distinc­
tions such as those qetween "lessee," "licensee," "invitee" and "guest," ... 
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The important distinction instead was between one who is "a victim 
of a search or seizure . . . as distinguished from one who claims 
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a conse­
quence of a search or seizure directed at someone else."65 A per­
son legitimately present in the place searched and who was targeted 
by the search had standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.66 
In 1967, the Court issued its landmark Fourth Amendment de­
cision, Katz v. United States.67 This decision articulated a new stan­
dard for determining if a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment had been conducted: whether the person had a subjec­
t.ive expectation of privacy that was objectively reasonable in the 
place searched.68 One year later, the Court indicated how this new 
standard would impact an employee's standing to challenge a work­
place search. 
1. 	 Reasonable Expectations of Freedom from Government 
Intrusion: Mancusi v. DeForte 
In Mancusi v. DeForte,69 the government had conducted a war­
rantless search of a Teamster's Union office as a result of a conspir­
acy and extortion investigation.70 The scope of the search included 
a large room used as an office by defendant DeForte, a Union vice­
president, as well as by several other Union officers.71 Over the 
defendant's objections, papers belonging to the Union were seized 
from the office.72 The papers were later used at trial to convict De­
Forte.73 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that DeForte had 
ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to 
constitutional safeguards. 
Id. at 266. 
65. 	 Id. at 261. 
66. Id. at 265-67 (noting that the defendant had established a sufficient interest in 
the premises searched by his legitimate presence therein). The defendant had spent at 
least a night in the apartment, he had been given keys to the apartment, and had kept 
some clothes there. Id. at 259. 
67. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). One scholar referred to Katz as "mark[ing] a watershed 
in [F]ourth [A]mendment jurisprudence." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382 (1974). 
68. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's concurrence 
established the two-prong inquiry viewed universally as the "Katz test". See LAFAVE, 
supra note 30, § 2.1(b), at 384-85 (noting that both the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court relied upon Justice Harlan's explanation of the Katz holding). 
69. 	 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
70. 	 Id. at 365. 
71. 	 [d. at 368. 
72. 	 [d. at 365. 
73. 	 Id. 
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standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim despite his failure to 
establish a property interest in the office or the papers seized.74 
Since DeForte had no property rights to establish standing, the 
Mancusi Court inquired instead whether, in light of all circum­
stances, the office was a place in which there was a "reasonable 
expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion."75 DeForte 
spent considerable time in the office and, at the time of the search, 
had custody of the papers seized.76 The office, however, was not 
DeForte's private office and the records were not taken from an 
area that was reserved for his personal use.77 
The Court focused on the question of whether the defendant 
had the right to exclude others from the place searched and the 
items seized.78 It concluded that it was immaterial that the work­
space was shared as long as the defendant could still reasonably 
expect that access would be limited to the others with whom he 
shared the office and guests invited by those persons.79 The Court 
further noted that the defendant could reasonably expect that no 
one would have access to the records seized without the permission 
of the persons with whom he shared the office or without permis­
sion from his superiors.80 Therefore, DeForte had a reasonable ex­
pectation of freedom from governmental intrusion and had 
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. 
The dissent had argued that an employee suffers no personal 
injury when the property of a corporation is seized, and hence, 
there was no basis upon which to claim a constitutional violation.81 
Certainly a person could not be a "victim" of a search and seizure if 
he or she was not the target of the search.82 It was immaterial, ac­
74. Id. at 369. 
75. Id. at 368. 
76. Id. at 368-69. 
77. Id. 
78. See id. at 369 (comparing the right to exclude others from a private office to 
one's right in an office shared by others). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 373-74 (Black, J., dissenting). This view is based on the principle that a 
corporation is the holder of property rights and thus the party who may rightfully assert 
a Fourth Amendment claim. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (6th 
Cir. 1991) (stating that a corporate officer may be the "person aggrieved" by corporate 
search); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that a corpo­
rate officer may be able to assert the right to privacy). But see Lagow v. United States, 
159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (discussing how a sole shareholder does 
not get the privilege of a corporation under the Fourth Amendment). 
82. Id. at 376-77 (Black, J., dissenting). See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(h), at 
212-19 for a discussion of the idea of "target standing" where a person targeted by the 
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cording to the dissent, whether or not the employee actually pre­
pared documents or was entrusted by the employer to keep custody 
of the papers.83 
Two important points emerged from the Court's holding. First, 
a defendant without property rights to either the place searched or 
the item seized may have a sufficient expectation of privacy to es­
tablish standing in a workplace search. Second, the use of an area 
need not be exclusive in order for a defendant to have standing. 
This point is of particular importance in workplace searches where 
employees may be likely to share work areas or to use multiple 
areas within the workplace. 
2. "Legitimate" Expectations of Privacy 
After the Court eliminated legal possession or ownership as a 
requirement for establishing standing, the role of property rights in 
determining privacy expectations began to re-emerge. As a result, 
with its decision in Rakas v. Illinois ,84 the Court began to narrow85 
or refine, depending on one's perspective, the broad language of 
the Katz standard.86 The first step taken by the Court was to elimi­
nate the question of standing as a distinct inquiry from the substan­
tive question of whether the search and seizure infringed an interest 
of the defendant that the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
protect.87 
search is considered for standing purposes to be a person aggrieved by, or a victim of, a 
search. 
83. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 373-74 (Black, J., dissenting). 
84. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
85. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 111 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the Court has "veer[ed] sharply from the path" set out in Katz); Rawlings 
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 115 n.* (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court's restrictive standard of "legitimate expectation of privacy" narrowed the privacy 
interests from Katz). 
86. See Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, 
and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914 (1997) 
(calling the Katz standard "broad" as compared to the strict property-based Fourth 
Amendment analysis that preceded Katz); Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the 
Scope of Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. 
L. REV. 487, 525 (1988) (stating that "Fourth amendment [sic] protection reached its 
height in Katz"). Some members of the Court have been highly critical of the Katz test 
as setting forth an unworkable standard. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concur­
ring) (calling it "notoriously unhelpful" and "self-indulgent" because of its subjectivity). 
87. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138-40. Despite the Court's rejection of a separate 
standing inquiry, many courts continue to use the term in their analysis. See, e.g., 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 97 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States 
v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305 (1st Cir. 1980); Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. 
1985); State. v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996). 
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In addition, the Court rejected the standard it had set forth 
earlier in Jones, in which a person, by virtue of being legitimately 
on the premises, had the right to assert a Fourth Amendment 
claim.88 The Court determined that the standard was too broad 
since it would permit even a casual visitor to assert a claim.89 In­
stead, a person must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of pri­
vacy in the place searched.90 
In explaining the importance of property rights in establishing 
privacy expectations, the Court noted that: 
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to 
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings 
that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main 
rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others and one 
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all 
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of 
this right to exclude.91 
In his concurrence, Justice Powell addressed the dissenters' ar­
gument that the plurality had reverted back to tying Fourth 
Amendment rights to property law.92 He noted that the ultimate 
question, whether a person's privacy expectations were reasonable, 
required an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances.93 Prop­
erty rights were merely one of several factors to be considered, with 
no single factor dispositive.94 Other important considerations in­
cluded whether the person had taken measures to guard their pri­
vacy, how the person had used the location searched, and whether 
it was the kind of intrusion historically found to be objectionable.95 
In a highly criticized decision one year later, Rawlings v. Ken­
tucky,96 the Court held that property rights in an item seized does 
88. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 143. 
91. [d. at 143 n.12 (citations omitted). 
92. [d. at 150 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 156-57 (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court's decision to tie Fourth Amendment rights back to property 
laws was motivated by its concerns about the exclusionary rule's impact). 
93. [d. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring). 
94. [d. (Powell, J., concurring). 
95. [d. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring). The totality approach and the factors 
cited by Justice Powell were adopted by the majority in subsequent cases. See, e.g., 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 
177-78 (1984). 
96. 448 U.S. 98, 117-18 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's 
decision resulted from too narrow a reading of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Tan­
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not automatically esfablish one's legitimate expectation of pri­
vacy.97 This aspect of the Rawlings holding may have been clarified 
to some extent by the Court's subsequent decision in O'Connor v. 
Ortega.98 In that decision, which addressed a workplace search by a 
government employer, the Court noted that certain kinds of per­
sonal items found in the workplace, such as luggage, handbags, or 
briefcases signal to others by their private nature that the owner has 
legitimate privacy expectations in the contents therein.99 
A more troubling aspect of Rawlings, especially as it affects 
searches beyond an employee's work area, is its potential limita­
tions on the Mancusi lOo holding. Rawlings had hidden drugs in an 
acquaintance's purse.lOl The Court found that Rawlings did not 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy since another friend's ac­
cess demonstrated that he did not have the right to exclude others 
from the purse.l02 In Mancusi, the defendant was allowed to assert 
a claim despite sharing access with others to the area searched.103 
More importantly, Rawlings suggests that the defendant's burden 
of proof is to show an expectation of freedom from all intrusions, 
rather than the Mancusi standard of an expectation of freedom 
from governmental intrusion.104 If the lower courts were to apply 
ner, 745 P.2d 757, 762, 762-63 n.7 (Or. 1987) (in banc) (disapproving of the Rawlings 
approach and stating that if A allows B to store property on A's property, then B 
should be able to assert a claim for a search uncovering B's property); LAFAVE, supra 
note 30, §l1.3(d), at 164 n.l91 (calling it a "poorly-reasoned case"); Simien Jr., supra 
note 86, at 490-92 (calling the Court's move to eliminate property rights as a separate 
basis upon which to assert a Fourth Amendment claim a "bloodless coup"). 
97. 448 U.S. at 105-06. 
98. 480 U.S. at 712 (addressing the appropriate standard for searches where the 
government is acting as employer, rather than as criminal investigator). Ortega was a 
doctor whose office was searched while he was on administrative leave due to allega­
tions of sexual harassment and other inappropriate conduct. Id. The Court established 
a different and lower standard, reasonableness, for searches when the government is 
acting as an employer. See id. at 722-23; United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 674 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (calling the O'Connor standard the "lesser burden of reasonableness"). 
99. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715-16 (discussing the importance of the context of a 
search). But see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301-07 (1999) (finding that the 
defendant could not assert a claim where her purse was taken from the back seat of a 
car in which she was a passenger). It is important to note that in Rawlings, the defen­
dant's property, his drugs, were found in someone else's purse. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 
101. 
100. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
101. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 101. 
102. Id. at 105-06. 
103. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (noting that it viewed no fundamental differ­
ence between a private office, in which the defendant could exclude all others, and an 
office space shared with others). 
104. Compare Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-05 (discussing the defendant's lack of 
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the Rawlings standard, it would be difficult for employees to assert 
Fourth Amendment claims in areas to which other employees have 
access. 
II. SEARCHES BEYOND ONE'S WORKSPACE 
It is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment extends to 
commercial premises. lOS Although property rights are not control­
ling in Fourth Amendment claims, those with property rights to the 
workplace are likely to be able to assert a claim to searches 
throughout the premises.106 Thus, a corporation107 as well as a sole 
proprietor of a business108 will usually be able to assert a Fourth 
Amendment claim. However, as noted in the previous section, 
these property owners' privacy expectations may be sufficiently re­
duced where the business is open to the public or is closely regu­
lated so that entry by police will not be subject to warrant 
requirements.109 
Employees, on the other hand, usually do not have property 
rights to the workplace itself. The Supreme Court has affirmed that 
an employee usually has a legitimate expectation of privacy in her 
own workspace.110 The Court has not, however, addressed the 
privacy expectations since other friends of the woman who owned the purse had ac­
cess), with Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368 (noting that a Fourth Amendment right "depends 
upon whether the area [searched] was one in which there was a reasonable expectation 
of freedom from governmental intrusion") (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
352 (1967)). The Court noted that "DeForte still could reasonably have expected that 
only those persons and their personal or business guests would enter the office, and that 
records would not be touched except with their permission or that of [company] higher­
ups." Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369. 
105. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978); See v. City of Seat­
tle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 
(1931); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920). 
106. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 163 (noting "it is fair to say that a 
defendant who does show ... [a property right in the invaded place] is most certain to 
be found to have standing"). 
107. See Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 390 (corporation); United States v. 
Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1988) (corporation and corporate officer); cf 
Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam) (distinguishing a 
corporate officer's rights from a corporation). 
108. See United States v. Trickey, 711 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir. 1983) (sole proprietor 
of outer building on property); State v. Penn, 576 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Ohio 1991) (phar­
macyowner). 
109. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of these limitations on Fourth Amend­
ment workplace claims. 
110. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716-17 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte, 
392 U.S. 364,369-70 (1968). 
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scope of Fourth Amendment protection when the search extends 
beyond the employee's workspace. 
Relying on guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court, 
the lower courts have essentially developed two approaches to de­
termine whether an employee has established a legitimate expecta­
tion of privacy in a search beyond her own workspace.111 One of 
these approaches weighs the "totality of circumstances," while the 
other focuses on the employee's ability to show a "nexus" to their 
own workspace. Parts II.A and B examine the application of these 
two approaches. Part II.C then examines a recent Tenth Circuit de­
cision, United States v. Anderson,112 in which the court discussed the 
competing merits of the two approaches in resolving this 
question. l13 
A. Totality of Circumstances 
When addressing the question of whether an employee's 
Fourth Amendment rights have been violated in a search beyond 
her workspace, many courts apply the same analytical framework 
that is utilized in non-workplace contexts.114 These courts, in keep­
ing with Justice Powell's concurrence in Rakas v. Illinois,1l5 ex­
amine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the 
employee has demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the area searched.116 The totality of circumstances may include 
111. In at least one case, a court has applied both. See State v. Richards, 552 
N.W.2d 197, 204-05 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the defendant could neither establish a 
nexus between areas nor the requisite relationship to the item seized). In addition, the 
Ninth Circuit has applied a third approach to limited circumstances, which it refers to as 
the co-conspirator exception. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of that approach. 
112. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998). 
113. It appears that this is the only case in which a court contemplated whether 
one test was preferable over another. See id. at 1230-32. 
114. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (affirming the Kentucky 
Supreme Court's holding that under the "totality of the circumstances" the defendant 
had not established a legitimate expectation of privacy in his associate's purse); United 
States v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (finding that 
the key holder to third person's apartment did not have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy based on the totality of circumstances). 
115. In Rakas, Justice Powell explained that the reasonableness of Fourth 
Amendment claims must be considered "in light of all of the surrounding circum­
stances." 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (addressing an automobile 
search). See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rakas 
decision. 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(considering "all of the relevant circumstances"); United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 
140 F.3d 610, 615 (5th Cir. 1998) (considering the "nuclei of factors"); United States v. 
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considerations of the employee's presence at the search-whether 
the employee has an ownership interest in the item seized, whether 
the employee took steps to guard her privacy, and whether the em­
ployee's position relative to the business gave her particular rights 
to the area searched.117 
Each of the factors considered may in some way bear on the 
employee's ability to exclude others from the place searched.118 
The scope of protection that the totality approach affords in a 
workplace search, therefore, may largely depend on whether the 
defendant must demonstrate the right to exclude all others or 
merely those who are not entitled through their work relationship 
to have access to the area searched. The Supreme Court's holding 
in Mancusi v. DeForte119 would indicate that the latter, more liberal 
approach might be applied in a workplace context.120 The Court's 
subsequent reasoning in Rawlings v. Kentucky,121 however, would 
Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (looking at the "totality of circumstances"); 
United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir. 1980) (considering a "variety of 
factors" suggested by the Supreme Court). 
117. Brien, 617 F.2d at 306 (comparing favorably the factors considered by the 
lower court: (1) the defendants' position in the business; (2) their ownership interest; 
(3) their job responsibilities; (4) their power to exclude others from the place searched; 
(5) whether they worked in the area and; (6) whether they were present at the time of 
the search, with those articulated by the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois). In Rakas, 
Justice Powell's concurrence noted that relevant factors included: whether the person 
took customary precautions to maintain privacy, how the person has used the area 
searched, whether the search took place in an area historically thought to be private, 
and whether the person has property rights in the location searched. 439 U.S. at 152 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
118. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142 n.12 (noting that property rights give rise to the 
right to exclude others from access); Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1232 (considering the defen­
dant's status as corporate officer as a basis for authority to exclude others); United 
States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that a salesman's occasional 
presence did not establish the right to exclude others from a desk which he shared with 
others); see also Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding it dis­
positive that employees did not have the right to exclude others from the factory prem­
ises). One commentator has suggested that Fourth Amendment rights should be 
determined on the basis of this criterion alone. See Clancy, supra note 53, at 344-65 
(arguing that property and privacy as a basis for defining the scope of Fourth Amend­
ment rights are too limited and that the right to exclude better protects an individual's 
rights). . 
119. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the Mancusi 
decision. 
120. See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369 (noting that the defendant could assert a Fourth 
Amendment claim despite the fact that the others with whom he shared the office, 
higher up officials, as well as business and personal guests of those persons could all 
have access to the records seized). 
121. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Rawlings. 
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support the former, more restrictive approach.122 
Illustrative of the courts' approach to this dilemma is the Kan­
sas Supreme Court's reasoning in State v. Worrell. 123 In Worrell, 
police retrieved shell casings from a search of the top floor of a 
warehouse that linked the warehouse manager to a murder.124 The 
defendant, who was also charged with security for the building, had 
been up there to shoot pigeons that had entered and set off the 
security alarm. The top floor was not open to the public and was 
mostly unused.125 The area, however, was accessible to other em­
ployees when directed by the manager to perform tasks there, to 
the business partners, and to several stockholders. The court, rely­
ing largely on the fact that others had access to the upper floor, held 
that the warehouse manager had no expectation of privacy 
therein.126 It appeared immaterial to the court that all persons hav­
ing access were all entitled to do so through their relationship to the 
business. 
The Kansas court did not indicate whether its holding might 
have differed if a smaller number of persons related to the business 
had been entitled to access. Some courts applying the totality ap­
proach have found that a defendant established a legitimate expec­
tation of privacy where access was limited to a small number of 
employees.127 For instance, corporate officers established a legiti­
mate expectation of privacy where police seized corporate docu­
122. See Rawlings, 448 u.s. at 105 (noting the defendant's inability to control 
access to the purse of an acquaintance in which his drugs were stored precluded his 
right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim, even though only one other person had been 
given "free access" to the purse). 
123. 666 P.2d 703 (Kan. i983). 
124. [d. at 704. 
125. [d. at 706. 
126. Id. The court also noted that neither the defendant's personal property nor 
business records were stored there. [d. 
127. See, e.g., United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589, 601 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(holding that defendant who owned stock with only three others and who had keys to 
the warehouse searched had a legitimate expectation of privacy), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Carter v. United States, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986); State v. Harms, 449 
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Neb. 1989) (holding that a partner in a construction business had a Fourth 
Amendment claim when a locked shed in which property was stored was searched and 
only the two partners had keys). Most courts, however, have held that having keys to 
the place searched in and of itself does not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
See United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that it 
disagreed with the lower court's reasoning that the defendant established privacy ex­
pectations because he had a key to the locked building); United States v. Baron-Man­
tilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that a key to the premises 
is insufficient to establish privacy expectation); State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197,204­
05 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a defendant who had one of two keys to the building 
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ments stored in locked file cabinets and in rooms to which only a 
few persons, including the defendants, had access.128 
Most claims arising from workplace searches involve the sei­
zure of work-related materials.129 Where, instead, personal items 
have been seized, the employee's own property rights may allow 
her to take certain measures to sufficiently limit access by others to 
establish privacy expectations under the totality approach.130 Fur­
thermore, as the Supreme Court noted in, O'Connor v. Ortega, 
some items may be so universally understood as personal that the 
nature of the item itself signals to others one's privacy expect a­
tions. l3l Thus, an employee may have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in items such as a briefcase or purse, regardless of access by 
other employees to the area in which the item is located.132 
Illustrative of the totality approach where personal property 
has been seized is the First Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Mancini.l 33 In Mancini, the court held that the town's mayor had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy where his appointment calendar 
could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim where nothing indicated that the items 
stored therein were personal). 
128. United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 305-06 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming the 
district court's finding that the defendants had standing to object to the search). The 
court also noted that the office in which the search took place, a commodity options 
firm, was heavily secured from access by the public. Id. at 306 0.9. 
129. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1230 (noting that "[m]ost cases that discuss em­
ployee standing involve seizure of work-related documents from the workplace."). In 
some instances, it is difficult to classify the materials either as personal or work-related. 
See, e.g., Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 509-10 (Ind. 1985) (involving a seizure of a vial 
of pills which were stored above the ceiling in the public bathroom of a pharmacy). 
130. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that property 
rights give rise to the right to exclude others from access). 
131. The plurality in O'Connor v. Ortega noted that: 
Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address can be 
considered part of the workplace context. ... An employee may bring closed 
luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a handbag or briefcase each 
workday. While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the exis­
tence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its presence in 
the workplace, the employee's expectation of privacy in the contents of the 
luggage is not affected in the same way. 
480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (emphasis in original). 
132. See id. (noting that "[t]he appropriate standard for a workplace search does 
not necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase 
that happens to be within the employer's business address"). Not alI personal items 
carry that same societal expectation of privacy. See United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 
104, 109 (1st CiT. 1993) (stating that "[t]he most intimate of documents, if left strewn 
about in the most public of places, would surely not [give rise to an expectation of 
privacy]") (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
133. 8 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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was seized from a box in the attic of the building in which he 
workedp4 The mayor had clearly marked the box to indicate that 
it contained his property.l35 Although he had given his chief of 
staff authority to go into the box, other employees knew not to ex­
amine the contents without authorization.136 Both the maintenance 
and personnel departments, however, had keys to the atticP7 The 
court found that, in light of his efforts to control access by others, 
the mayor had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal 
property.138 
In sum, the totality approach aggregates various facts to deter­
mine if, as a whole, they demonstrate an employee's legitimate ex­
pectation of privacy. Many of these factors relate to an employee's 
right to exclude others from the place searched. Personal property 
rights or a position of authority among a small number of employ­
ees may establish a basis upon which to assert this authority.139 
This approach, however, provides no clear answer to the question 
of to what extent this right must be asserted: whether an employee 
must be able to exclude all others from the area searched, whether 
she must be one of a limited number of persons to have access, or 
whether she may exclude only those who do not have the right to 
access through their work relationship.140 
B. The Nexus Test 
The totality approach analyzes a workplace claim in the same 
manner as searches conducted in other contexts. Thus, factors spe­
cifically relevant to the workplace are not raised.141 Some other 
134. Id. at 110. 
135. The box was marked "Mayor's Appointment Books." Id. at 107 n.6. 
136. Id. at 110 n.11 (quoting from a city employee's testimony). 
137. Id. at 106. 
138. Id. at 110 (stating that "Mancini could have expected that only members of 
the maintenance or personnel staff, who had instructions not to disturb the Mayor's 
boxes, could enter the attic, and that his personal records would not be touched except 
with his permission or that of his Chief of Staff."). The court also noted that the Mayor 
had worked in the building for nineteen years and that the attic was upstairs in the 
building in which he worked during this time. [d. This may relate to one factor the 
court weighed in its consideration - the historical use of the property. See id. at 109 
(setting forth the relevant factors). 
139. See id. at 110 (personal property); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 
n.9 (1st Cir. 1980) (defendant corporate officers were among the few entitled to access). 
140. For instance, the First Circuit's decision in Mancini may be reconciled with 
the narrower scope of the Supreme Court's holding in Rawlings v. Kentucky as well as 
the broader scope of the Court's Mancusi v. DeForte decision. See supra Part ILA and 
infra Part II.B for a discussion of both Supreme Court cases. 
141. But see Brien, 617 F.2d at 306 (considering the defendants' positions in the 
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courts have relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mancusi 
v. DeForte to create an approach specific to workplace claims.142 
Recall that in Mancusi, work-related documents were seized from 
somewhere in a large room in which the defendant had a desk along 
with several others.143 Using this setting as a starting point, these 
courts have determined that an employee's privacy expectation may 
extend beyond their exclusive workspace if the employee can 
demonstrate some "nexus" between the area searched and their 
workspace.l44 An employee may show a nexus was established by 
showing some relationship between the area searched and one's 
employment activities.145 
The nexus test was first expressly articulated in a Fifth Circuit 
case, Britt v. United States .146 In that case, a corporate president 
attempted to suppress documents that were seized from a building 
used by the corporation as a storage space,147 Because the docu­
ments were corporate property and Britt was not the corporation's 
sole shareholder, he had to establish a basis independent from the 
corporation's upon which to assert a Fourth Amendment claim.148 
firm). The First Circuit determined that the lower court's factors were consistent with 
the usual factors considered by the courts under the totality approach. [d. 
142. See United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th CiT. 1975) (comparing the 
Mancusi facts with the ones at issue in Britt, noting that in Mancusi, "there was a 
demonstrated nexus between the area searched and the work space of the defendant."); 
LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 164 (calling this approach consistent with Mancusi 
and noting that it "is more likely to be relevant with respect to a far greater variety of 
officers and employees of various business enterprises" than the usual approach). See 
supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the Mancusi case. 
143. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968). 
144. Some courts expressly refer to a "nexus" in their decisions, while others rely 
on the nexus reasoning without using the term. Compare United States v. Anderson, 
154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th CiT. 1998) (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("nexus"), and United States 
v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d CiT. 1990) ("nexus"), and Britt, 508 F.2d at 1056 
("nexus"), and Tobias v. State, 479 N.E.2d 508, 510 (Ind. 1985) ("nexus"), and State v. 
Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Minn. 1996) ("nexus"), with United States v. Mohney, 
949 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (6th CiT. 1991) (considering the same factors as the Fifth Circuit 
did in discussing the nexus relationship in Britt), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. 
Supp. 227, 230-31 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (relying on the fact that the corporate officer worked 
in the corporate suite), and State v. Williams, 417 A.2d 1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980) (relying 
on the defendant's work connection to the storage closet searched as a basis for estab­
lishing his right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim). 
145. See Britt, 508 F.2d at 1056; LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 11.3(d), at 164-65 ("In 
the absence of some other basis for showing standing, ... it still seems necessary to 
establish that the place searched was rather directly connected with the defendant's 
employment responsibilities and activities."). 
146. 508 F.2d at 1056. 
147. [d. at 1055. The office where the corporation conducted its daily business 
had also been searched. [d. at 1053-54. 
148. See id. at 1055 (discussing the usual rule that applies where corporate prop­
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The Fifth Circuit held that Britt failed to establish that basis since 
there was no "demonstrated nexus between the area searched and 
the workspace of the defendant."149 
The Britt court enumerated several factors that mitigated 
against a finding of the requisite nexus.150 Britt had never worked 
in the area searched. In addition, the documents seized were 
neither prepared by him nor taken from his personal work area, 
which was located in another building. Finally, he was not present 
when the search took place. The court concluded that, unlike the 
Union vice-president in Mancusi, Britt failed to establish a nexus 
between the area searched and his workspace.151 
Britt indicates that an employee may demonstrate a nexus 
where she performs some work-related duties in an area, even if 
that area is not her primary workspace. This reasoning is consistent 
with a pre-Britt decision in which corporate officers who worked in 
a corporate suite were entitled to assert Fourth Amendment claims 
where areas beyond their office were searched.152 Likewise, in a 
later case, a custodian was found to have a legitimate privacy expec­
tation in a storage room in which he kept his tools. 153 Where the 
contact is infrequent or there is less physical proximity between the 
area searched and the. employee's workspace, the nexus may be too 
tenuous to provide a basis upon which to assert a Fourth Amend­
ment claim.154 
erty is at issue). See also supra notes 53·57 and accompanying text for the case law 
from which this rule originates. 
149. Id. at 1056. The Mancusi decision never expressly discussed a nexus require­
ment. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See also supra Part LB.1 for a 
discussion of Mancusi. 
150. Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055. 
151. Id. at 1056. 
152. United States v. Lefkowitz, 464 F. Supp. 227, 231 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (expressly 
rejecting the governments contention that the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights 
should be limited to their own office and extending the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection to include the entire suite). 
153. State v. Williams, 417 A.2d 1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980). The storage closet, lo­
cated in the basement of a tavern, was not accessible to the public and was kept locked. 
Id. 
154. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1404 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a corporate officer, who operate'd his business as a sole proprietorship, could not 
assert a claim where corporate papers were seized from an office that he rarely visited); 
Chuang v. United States, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a bank presi­
dent had not established a nexus where bank documents were seized from another bank 
official's office on a different floor). The Chuang court emphasized that the defen­
dant's office was on the fourth floor and the documents were seized from an office on 
the third floor. Id. at 648, 650. The court was also influenced by the fact that the search 
took place in a bank, an industry that is subject to intense oversight by the government. 
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In addition to infrequency of use, use of the area for a non­
work related purpose may weigh against demonstrating the requi­
site nexus. These considerations were highlighted in an Indiana Su­
preme Court decision, Tobias v. United States .155 In Tobias, the 
defendant was a pharmacist in his father's pharmacy business.156 
The pharmacy contained two bathrooms, one for employees and 
one for the public.157 Employees had informed police that they sus­
pected Tobias was dealing drugs when, on several occasions, they 
noticed he and another person met briefly in the pharmacy and 
then went to the public restroom in succession.158 Police later re­
trieved drugs from the area above the ceiling tiles in the bath­
room.159 The court found that there was no nexus "since the only 
time this area was visited by [the defendant] was for the purpose of 
making the instant drug transaction. "160 Thus, the implication is 
that the defendant might have established a nexus had he either 
used the area with greater frequency or for its intended purpose. 
Another factor that Britt indicated might establish a nexus be­
tween the area searched and one's workspace is some role in the 
preparation of the work materials seized.161 The courts applying 
the nexus test have not clarified whether one must actually draft the 
documents or whether one could expressly direct a subordinate to 
draft it on her behalf. However, in at least one case, a corporate 
president's role in preparing the seized documents was insufficient 
as the sole basis for asserting a Fourth Amendment claim.162 
Although the Britt court mentioned presence at the search as a 
See id. at 650. See supra Part l.A.2 for a discussion of lesser privacy expectation in 
highly regulated industries pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 
155. 479 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. 1985). 




160. Id. at 510. The court's reliance on the nexus test seems odd in light of the 
fact that the court could have decided the case based on the public access to the bath­
room. See supra Part l.A.l for a discussion of the importance of the public/private 
distinction in workplace searches. 
161. United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that the 
corporate records were not prepared by the defendant); see Mohney, 949 F.2d at 1403 
(citing Britt and noting that lack of personal preparation of corporate materials seized 
indicated one factor against finding a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
162. United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989). The defendant 
was also the sole shareholder of the corporation and its chief operating officer. Id. at 
1411. The corporate documents were seized from a bookkeeping office in a different 
building from the one in which the defendant worked. !d. 
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factor to be considered,163 the Supreme Court's holding in Rakas 
makes it clear that legitimate presence alone is no longer a suffi­
cient basis for asserting a Fourth Amendment claim.164 Thus, no 
courts have held that presence at the search alone establishes the 
requisite nexus. 
In comparing the nexus test to the totality approach, similari­
ties as well as distinctions emerge. Both approaches consider multi­
ple factors to determine if an employee has demonstrated a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.165 In addition, the nexus test's 
consideration of the frequency of use of the area searched may like­
wise bear on the employee's ability to control access by others 
under the totality approach.166 In contrast, the totality approach 
may consider the defendant's position of authority as a basis to ex­
clude others, while that fact is irrelevant in the nexus approach.167 
In Part ILC, this Note next examines a recent Tenth Circuit deci­
sion in which the court considered the competing merits of the two 
approaches. 
C. The Nexus or Totality Approach?: United States v. Anderson 
In United States v. Anderson,168 the Tenth Circuit considered 
whether the nexus test should be applied where personal property 
of an employee was seized in an area in which the defendant had 
163. Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055. 
164. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978) (rejecting "legitimately on the 
premises" as a basis for asserting a claim). 
165. Factors considered under the totality approach may include: the employee's 
presence at the search, whether the employee has ownership interest in the item seized, 
whether the employee took steps to guard their privacy, and whether the employee's 
position relative to the business gave them particular rights to the area searched. See 
supra note 117 for the factors applied by a district court in the First Circuit and their 
comparison to those articulated by the Supreme Court. Under the nexus test, the court 
may consider whether the employee worked in the area searched, whether they had a 
role in the preparation of the documents, and whether the employee is present at the 
search. See Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055. 
166. See United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1091 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that 
"[o]ccasional presence, [ ] without any right to exclude others, is not enough"). 
167. Compare United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1993) (consider­
ing in its totality approach that the mayor had the authority to instruct others not to 
enter his box in the attic archive), and United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 
1980) (considering in its totality approach the defendant's position in the firm), with 
United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1990) (giving no weight under the 
nexus test to the fact that the defendant was the bank president), and United States v. 
Britt, 508 F.2d at 1055 (giving no weight under the nexus test to the defendant's posi­
tion as corporate president). 
168. 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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never worked.169 The panel concluded, over a vigorous dissent by 
Judge Kelly, that the court should not apply the nexus test because 
it fails to account for certain relevant factors. 17o As a result, the 
court decided to apply a three-part test consistent with the totality 
approach.l71 
The defendant, Anderson, had been suspected by the FBI of 
interstate trafficking in child pornography.172 Anderson was set up 
in a sting operation when an FBI informant sent him some tapes.173 
To the dismay of the agents, who had secured a warrant for his 
home, Anderson took the tapes from the mail drop to his office 
building.174 It was a holiday weekend and Anderson entered the 
locked building with the master key that he held as corporate vice­
president.175 Anderson went to a vacant room some distance from 
his office, closed the door, and pulled the curtains across the win­
dowP6 Agents broke into the building and found Anderson pre­
paring to watch the tapes.177 The agents then secured incriminating 
statements and evidence from Anderson.178 
On appeal from the district court's decision suppressing the ev­
idence, the government argued that Anderson did not have stand­
ing to challenge the searchp9 It argued that he had neither a 
possessory nor proprietary interest in the room searched, nor a 
169. See id. at 1230-32 (discussing the merits and deficiencies of the nexus 
approach). 
170. Id. at 1232. 
171. See id. at 1230 (stating that "the better approach is to examine all of the 
circumstances of the working environment and the relevant search.") (citing Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)). See also infra note 187 and accompanying text for 
the three-part test. 
172. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1227. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1227-28. The key gave him universal access with the exception of the 
president's office. Id. at 1228-29. 
176. Id. at 1227. The office was in the interior section of the building. Id. The 
dissent noted that the room was far from Anderson's office. Id. at 1236 (Kelly, J., 
dissenting). 
177. The FBI agent broke in when they became concerned that Anderson would 
destroy evidence once he discovered the tapes were blank. Id. at 1227-28. The agents 
knocked, but were unaware that Anderson could not hear them since he was not wear­
ing his hearing aids. Id. at 1228. 
178. Id. at 1228. Some pornography was seized from a location in Anderson's 
office that he identified for them. See id. 
179. Id. at 1229. The government also argued that exigent circumstances created 
an exception to the warrant requirement, id., but the circuit court affirmed the lower 
court's holding that the government failed to meet the requisite standards to prove 
exigency. Id. at 1233-34. 
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nexus between his job and the room searched.180 The district court 
had relied upon the defendant's position as corporate vice-presi­
dent and his possession of a master key as a basis for standing.181 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds.182 The 
court first discussed the merits of applying the nexus test, noting 
that the test is often applied in workplace contexts since it is usually 
work-related materials that have been seized in such searches.183 It 
agreed that a nexus is an important consideration under those cir­
cumstances.184 The court rejected the premise, however, that 
whether an employee works in the area searched should be disposi­
tive in her Fourth Amendment claim.185 It concluded that the 
nexus test is inadequate since it fails to account for factors the court 
thought relevant to an employee's right to contest a search.186 
Relevant factors for the Tenth Circuit included an employee's 
relationship to the item seized, such as bailment or ownership; 
whether the employee had control over the item at the time it was 
seized; and whether the employee took steps to maintain privacy 
relative to the item.187 The court also noted that the authority to 
exclude others from the area searched is an important considera­
tion.188 The court cited several Supreme Court cases in support of 
the application of these factors.189 After applying these factors to 
180. See id. at 1229. The government's argument was similar to the criteria ap­
plied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Chuang, in which the court held that the 
defendant had to show both a proprietary or possessory interest in the area searched as 
well as a nexus to his workspace. 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990). 
181. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1228-29. 
182. Id. at 1229. 
183. [d. at 1230. 
184. [d. 
185. Id. ("We endorse the 'business nexus' test to the extent we share a belief 
that an employee enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in his work space ... 
However, we do not believe the fact that a defendant does or does not work in a partic­
ular area should categorically control his ability to challenge a warrantless search.") 
186. [d. 
187. Id. at 1231-32. . 
188. Id. at 1232' n.3 (rejecting the government's analogy between the instant case 
and apartment cases in which the courts have held that tenants do not have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in common areas). 
189. See id. at 1231-32. The court relied upon O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 
715-16 (1986), Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980), and United States v. 
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980) as support for the importance of property rights as a 
relevant consideration. Id. at 1231. The court cited Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 
369 (1968), as support for its reliance on the factor considering an employee's control 
over the item. Id. at 1232. Finally, the court cited Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,148-49 
(1978), for the proposition that an employee's right to exclude others is an important 
factor. [d. at 1232 n.3. 
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the circumstances, the court concluded that Anderson had demon­
strated a legitimate expectation of privacy in light of his efforts to 
exclude others from the room and his control over the items at the 
time of the search. l90 
Judge Kelly argued in dissent that absent a nexus between the 
area searched and Anderson's workspace, his claim should fail,191 
The majority's approach failed to consider that Fourth Amendment 
protectiOJ:l is more limited in commercial premises.192 It also put 
too much emphasis on Anderson's relationship to the item 
seized.193 Judge Kelly argued that under the majority's analysis, 
Anderson would have been able to challenge a claim anywhere in 
the building, as long as he kept the tapes in his possession and took 
steps to maintain his privacy,194 
In this case, Judge Kelly argued, there was no nexus. The room 
in which Anderson was found was not his office. It was located 
some distance from his office, it was a vacant room, and it was ac­
cessible to other employees,195 There was no evjdence that Ander­
son had ever worked in the room.196 Furthermore, Judge Kelly 
concluded that there was no evidence to support the majority's 
finding that Anderson had the right to exclude others from the 
190. Id. at 1233. 
191. Id. at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Judge Kelly did not argue that the factors 
mentioned by the majority were irrelevant, just insufficient" without a proven nexus. See 
id. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
192. See id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Dewey v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 
(1981)). It is noteworthy that the case Judge Kelly cites is one in which the Supreme 
Court stated this difference in the context of heavily regulated industries. See supra 
Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the reduced scope of Fourth Amendment protection in a 
heavily regulated industry. 
193. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1235-36 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The courts are not 
uniform in their approach to the question of whether a defendant must demonstrate a 
privacy expectation with regards to the item or the place searched. Compare United 
States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) ("privacy or property interest in 
premises searched or item seized") (emphasis added), and State v. Williams, 417 A.2d 
1046, 1048 (N.J. 1980) ("test is whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the property or premises involved") (emphasis added), with United States v. 
Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1993) ("defendant must demonstrate a privacy expec­
tation in both the item seized and the place searched) (emphasis added) and United 
States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) ("question ... focuses principally on 
whether [the defendant] has made a sufficient possessory or proprietary interest in the 
area searched) (emphasis added), and State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 705 (Kan. 1983) 
("[T]est ... is not whether that person 'had a possessory interest in the item seized, but 
whether he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched."') (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
194. Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
195. Id. at 1236 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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room.197 
The Anderson opinions exemplify the conflicting views held by 
the courts as to what creates the basis upon which an employee may 
establish a legitimate privacy expectation. The nexus approach re­
lies upon the legitimate privacy expectations created in the em­
ployee's own workspace and then expands the protection afforded 
in that space if a sufficient connection can be made to the area 
searched.198 The totality approach considers various factors but 
often relies upon a showing that sufficient efforts were made to pro­
tect one's privacy by excluding others to establish the requisite pri­
vacy expectations.199 
In the next section, this Note argues that the basis of an em­
ployee's privacy expectations is, instead, created through the em­
ployment relationship. It further argues that the nexus and totality 
approaches, as applied, are deficient in protecting employees' 
Fourth Amendment rights beyond their own workspace by failing 
to recognize this basis. Part III suggests an alternative approach 
that makes the employment relationship the central focus of deter­
mining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection in workplace 
searches. 




In order to assess the merits of the approaches currently taken 
by the courts or an alternative to those approaches, it is important 
to consider the context in which this issue arises. Part lILA begins 
with a discussion of how employees function in the workplace: what 
kinds of relationships are created and what kind of rights and obli­
197. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that "one does not gain such right merely 
by closing the door and covering a window"). Judge Kelly did not discuss the fact that 
Anderson's master key may have given him access to the building that others might not 
have had. 
198. See id. at 1235 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (noting that an employee's Fourth 
Amendment claim cannot prevail "absent a 'demonstrated nexus between the area 
searched and the workspace of the defendant"') (quoting United States v. Britt, 508 
F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975». 
199. See id. at 1232 (calling the authority to exclude an important consideration, 
focusing on the defendant's dominion and control over the item as well as the efforts 
taken to keep others out of the room); United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (focusing on the steps that the mayor had taken to ensure that others would 
not have access to his belongings even though the attic was an area to which limited 
people had access); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 306 (1st Cir. 1980) (focusing 
on the security measures taken by the firm to restrict access and the positions of the 
defendants which entitled them to access). 
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gations arise from those relationships. Part III.B cntIques the 
nexus and totality approaches as applied by the courts in light of the 
importance of this relationship. Part III.C explains why the current, 
narrower scope of Fourth Amendment protection that the courts 
have defined for the workplace has the potential to create unin­
tended adverse consequences in both the workplace and beyond. 
Finally, Part III.D suggests an alternative approach that accounts 
for the importance of the employment relationship in creating pri­
vacy expectations. This approach recognizes important Fourth 
Amendment limiting principles while creating a sufficiently broad 
scope of protection to protect legitimate privacy expectations. 
A. The Workplace & The Employment Relationship 
The workplace is, by necessity, an environment that requires a 
degree of cooperation amongst employees in order to accomplish a 
shared goal or goals set by the employer.2°O The shared goal may 
be as broad as achieving targeted sales or profits, creating a final 
product, improving the quality of goods or services, or increasing 
the number of customers served.201 In order to accomplish this 
goal, it is common for an employer to delegate duties and responsi­
bilities to various employees. 
Once an employer202 hires an employee to help it achieve its 
goals, an agency relationship is created between the parties which 
gives rise to certain obligations and expectations. 203 A fiduciary 
duty is created, obligating the employee to make certain efforts to 
200. See generally Cynthia L. EstIund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil 
Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the importance of the workplace 
to democratic society because of its ability to foster ongoing cooperative relations of 
trust and common interest among individuals). Trends indicate that workplace models 
that further facilitate a cooperative environment are increasing amongst employers. 
See Estlund, supra, at 67 (noting "many firms are moving towards more cooperative 
modes of organization, more diffuse authority relations, and flatter organizational pyra­
mids"); Jerry Ackerman, Dawn of the Space Age: The New Trend in Office Design Aims 
for Fewer Walls and a Collaborative Atmosphere - Office Design Moves Toward Open 
Space Offices - Offices Move Out in Open K, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2000, at K1; The 
Case For Teams, PURCHASING MAGAZINE, June 3, 1999, at 108. 
201. The function of goals as easily applies to large scale, legitimate businesses as 
small scale, illegal ones. For instance, a group selling drugs on street corners has profit 
goals and may look to expand its customer base. 
202. An employer could be a sole proprietor or a corporation that acts through its 
corporate officers. 
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1) (2000 App.) ("Agency is a 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of control by one person to an­
other that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the 
other to so act. "). 
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protect the employer from harm.204 This duty also imposes limita­
tions on the employee's freedom of action.20s In some instances, an 
employer may reciprocate by offering legal protection to the em­
ployee by indemnifying them for actions taken within the scope of 
employment.206 
The importance of the employment relationship in affecting 
workplace privacy expectations is demonstrated by the fact that 
courts have found employees' consent to police searches in the 
workplace valid absent express authorization.207 Although the 
courts have no uniform approach to determining the validity of em­
ployee consent, many courts rely upon the principal-agent relation­
ship as a basis for such authority.20s Additionally, courts have 
relied upon joint access or control, assumption of risk by the em­
ployer, and apparent authority as a rationale for upholding em­
ployee consent to a search.209 
This agency/employment relationship creates privacy expecta­
tions in the employer since she would justifiably expect her employ­
ees not to do her harm. Because of the necessity of collaboration 
and work delegation required to accomplish shared goals, an em­
204. See id. § 13 ("An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope 
of his agency."). 
205. See id. § 379 (imposing duty of care and skill on employee); § 393 (restricting 
an employee's right to compete with the principal's business); § 395 (forbidding an em­
ployee from acting in concert with those whose interests conflict with the employer); 
§ 395-96 (restricting an employee's ability to disclose confidential information both dur­
ing employment and after it terminates). 
206. See, e.g., 1 FOLKS ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, § 145 
(4th ed. 2000 Supp.) ("Indemnification of officers, directors, employees and agents; in­
surance"); see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992) (affirming 
an agreement indemnifying the corporate director). 
207. See United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1193-94 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding 
consent valid where the deputy sheriff consented to a search of the sheriff's office); 
United States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759, 764-66 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding consent 
valid where a research assistant allowed the search of a professor's university lab which 
he had permission to use). 
208. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 8.6(c) (discussing employee consent 
and noting that the courts are influenced by factors such as the employee's duties rela­
tive to the area searched and the employee's status). 
209. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 (1974) (finding consent valid 
where there is "joint access or control for most purposes"); United States v. Sells, 496 
F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1974) (relying on apparent authority); United States v. Grigsby, 
367 F. Supp. 900, 902 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (relying upon assumption of risk); Common­
wealth v. Wahlstrom, 375 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Mass. 1978) (relying on apparent authority); 
see also Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of 
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1642 (1987) (noting that third-party consent has 
been justified on an assumption of risk rationale as well as reduced expectations of 
privacy). 
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ployer must also expect employees collectively to protect her pri­
vacy expectations. As one scholar has noted, "[t]he necessarily 
cooperative and social nature of work itself also tends to depend 
upon and to engender trust among coworkers."2Io As a result, pri­
vacy expectations are created in the employee regarding work 
materials from those outside of the business or those employees 
whose job responsibilities do not entitle them to access.2II The em­
ployer's privacy expectation in work materials is, thus, extended 
from the employer to the employee.212 
Employees' privacy expectations with respect to their personal 
property raises different issues since the employer does not have a 
similar privacy interest in those items. Several members of the Su­
preme Court have recognized that "an employee's private life must 
intersect with the workplace" and therefore, "tidy distinctions [ ] 
between the workplace and professional affairs, on the one hand, 
and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do not 
exist in reality."213 Employers may also take affirmative steps to 
create privacy expectations with respect to personal items by ac­
tions that further blur the previously distinct spheres of personal 
and professional lives: allowing or encouraging employees to deco­
rate work areas with personal items; offering on-site personal ser­
vices such as day care, health clubs, and shower facilities; or 
arranging social functions in the workplace. 
B. 	 The Recognition of Relationships as a Basis for Privacy 
Expectations 
Both the courts and commentators have recognized relation­
ships as a source of shared privacy rights. The Supreme Court, in 
210. 	 Estlund, supra note 200, at 10. 
211. This view is supported by the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mancusi v. De­
Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). The Court found that the defendant had a legitimate expec­
tation of privacy in documents that were merely in his custody despite the fact that 
numerous others were entitled to access to the office and the seized documents. Id. at 
367-69. DeForte, the other union officials who shared the office, and union higher-ups 
all had access to the documents. [d. at 369. See supra Part l.B.l for a discussion of 
Mancusi. 
212. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text explaining how the Supreme 
Court has recognized in other contexts how a person possessing legitimate privacy ex­
pectations may extend their Fourth Amendment protection to another on the basis of a 
certain kind of relationship. See generally Coombs, supra note 209 (discussing how 
privacy rights are shared as a result of relationships in other contexts and arguing for a 
broader recognition of this basis of privacy expectations). 
213. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
Uoined by three other justices). 
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contexts other than the workplace, has recognized the importance 
of relationships in creating privacy expectations, albeit most often 
by finding the relationship too insubstantial to engender such ex­
pectations.214 The Court has differentiated between an overnight 
guest's and a casual visitor's relationship to a homeowner as an im­
portant distinction in Fourth Amendment claims.2Is It has rea­
soned that an overnight guest has legitimate privacy expectations in 
the host's home because the homeowner has chosen to extend his 
protection to her.216 The Court has also found that a homeowner's 
ultimate control over the house is not incompatible with a guest's 
legitimate expectation of privacy therein.217 As a result, the scope 
of protection established by the relationship extends to areas be­
yond those set aside for the overnight guest's personal use.2IS 
One relationship-based theory that has been applied in the 
lower courts outside of the Fourth Amendment context has been 
214. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (holding that the lack of 
connection between the defendant and the homeowner was a factor mitigating against 
his right to object to a search); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (rejecting 
the defendant's claim, in part, because the defendant had only known the person who 
was holding his drugs for a few days and had never asked her to hold goods for him 
before). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court's opinion was replete with 
references to the importance of relationships and why the Court should not recognize 
less substantial ones as protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 142 (rejecting 
"legitimately on the premises" since it would allow a casual visitor to object to searches 
in areas to which they had not had access); id. at 142 n.12 (discussing a trespasser's lack 
of rights); id. at 433 (rejecting the defendant's claims since they were "merely" 
passengers). 
215. Compare Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1990) (overnight guest 
may assert a Fourth Amendment claim), and Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265­
67 (1960) (overnight guest may assert a claim) overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1983), with Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91 (casual visitor en­
gaged in commercial transaction may not assert a claim). See also United States v. 
Rodriguez-Lopez, No. 98-10075, 1999 WL 109632, at *1 (Feb. 26,1999 9th Cir.) for an 
interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Carter to mean that "ordinary social 
or business visitors enjoy no personal expectation of privacy in the homes of others," 
and supra note 20 for information on the continuing vitality of Jones and Fourth 
Amendment rights for overnight guests. 
216. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99 (stating that "[t]he houseguest is there with the permis­
sion of his host, who is willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest.") (em­
phasis added); see also United States v. Osorio, 949 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that "the Court reasoning in Olson that an overnight guest could depend on his host to 
protect his privacy interests"). 
217. Olson, 495 U.S. at 99. 
218. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1960) (citing Jones v. United 
States for the proposition that simply because an area was not set aside for Jones' per­
sonal use, it did not diminish his standing rights in that area as an overnight guest). But 
see Osorio, 949 F.2d at 41 (stating in dicta that a guest cannot have privacy expectations 
in areas of the host's house that are off limit or of which the guest has no knowledge). 
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that of constructive possession.219 Construct'ive possession means 
that a person has the power and intention to exercise control over 
property either directly or through other persons.220 It may be held 
jointly or solely.221 Constructive possession as a basis for Fourth 
Amendment rights has been raised but not addressed yet by the 
Supreme Court.222 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has embraced a related theory, 
which it refers to as the "co-conspirator" exception.223 Under this 
theory, courts may extend the scope of Fourth Amendment protec­
tion beyond an area over which a person has exclusive control 
where the person asserting the claim can demonstrate a "formal ar­
rangement for joint control" between themselves and the person 
whose property was seized.224 The court considers "the degree of 
cooperation and the respective possessory interest asserted."225 
The court has most often found the requisite relationship where the 
defendant had some ownership interest in the seized property,226 
but it has indicated that significant evidence of a formalized ar­
rangement or presence at the search and a lesser quantum of evi­
dence of a formal arrangement may suffice.227 
219. The courts have recognized constructive possession as a legal theory in drug 
possession cases. See United States v. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d 610, 615·16 (7th Cir. 
1986); Commonwealth v. Bonilla, 590 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
220. United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1975). 
221. Stockheimer, 807 F.2d at 615. 
222. In Brown v. United States, the defendants raised a joint possession/co-con­
spirator defense. 411 U.S. 223 at 230 n.4 (1973). The Court did not address the issue 
since it held that the conspiracy had terminated before the seizure took place. See id. 
223. See generally Michelle Alexandria Curtis, Note, Ninth Circuit Joint Venture 
Standing: A Joint Possessory Interest is Sufficient to Establish Fourth Amendment Stand­
ing, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 311 (1992) for an extended discussion of this approach in various 
settings. 
224. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 671(9th Cir. 1991) (citing Schowen­
gardt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1987)) (calling the co­
conspirator approach an exception "to the general Rakas rule against contesting the 
violation of another person's fourth amendment rights."). 
225. Id. (noting that while the phrase could encompass a range of conduct, from a 
formal contract to any loose arrangement for a cooperative illegal venture, the correct 
meaning lies somewhere in between). 
226. See id. (noting that in "virtually every case applying the exception," the per­
son asserted a property interest); see also United States v. Johns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1136 
(9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Quinn, 751 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
227. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 671-72. The court has rejected the application of the ex­
ception where simply a criminal conspiracy takes place in a specific location. Id. Thus, 
a defendant could not assert a claim where his employer's property was used for unau­
thorized purposes in another employee/co-conspirator's office. See id. at 668-69, 671-72 
(holding that a DEA agent could not assert the co-conspirator exception where he was 
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Professor Mary Coombs has argued that the courts should 
adopt a relational model for analyzing Fourth Amendment 
claims.228 She notes that the concept of shared privacy better re­
flects the way in which people actually behave in the world.229 
Under her approach, those who may assert a claim "include deriva­
tive claimants - people with a. relationship with the primary 
rightholder such that we would expect the primary rightholder to 
share the umbrella of her claim."230 The courts could incorporate 
these relational notions of privacy as part of the totality of the cir­
cumstances approach.231 
In sum, there is support for the concept of relationships as a 
basis for Fourth Amendment rights. Like the guest who expects the 
host not to allow others to enter the home whose interest is adverse 
to the guest,232 the employee has similar expectations of her em­
ployer. In addition, the collaborative environment of the work­
place creates the necessary "degree of cooperation" required under 
the Ninth Circuit's ajJproach.233 The obligations that arise as a re­
sult of the employment relationship likewise establish a sufficiently 
"formal relationship for control" to establish an adequate basis for 
finding shared privacy rights.234 Consequently, any analysis that 
considers an employee's Fourth Amendment rights should consider 
the nature of the employment relationship . 
. 
C. Evaluating the Totality & Nexus Approaches 
Both the nexus and totality approaches to some degree con­
sider the employment relationship when determining an employee's 
right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim beyond their workspace. 
The nexus test takes into account whether the employee asserting 
the claim played any role in preparing seized documents.235 Also 
by considering whether the employee worked in the area searched, 
using a DEA pen register in a co-worker's office to record phone numbers in contra­
vention of DEA policy requiring judicial authorization before taking such action). 
228. See generally Coombs, supra note 209. 
229. Id. at 1596-97. 
230. [d. at 1597. 
231. See id. at 1598, 1650-61 (articulating the various considerations relevant to 
such an analysis). 
232. See Minnesota v. Carter, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (noting that it is unlikely that 
a homeowner would invite someone into the house contrary to the guest's wishes). 
233. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of these crite­
ria under the Ninth Circuit's co-conspirator exception. 
234. See id. 
235. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for the application of this 
criterion. 
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the nexus test indirectly considers the employment relationship.236 
The totality test also indirectly considers this relationship where the 
courts consider an employee's position as it relates to her authority 
to exclude others from the area searched.237 
Both tests, however, fail to adequately recognize important as­
pects of the employment relationship in establishing an employee's 
privacy expectations. The nexus test ignores the realities of work­
place delegation of duties. Under the nexus-test, despite ultimate 
responsibility for information contained in corporate documents, a 
corporate officer may fail to demonstrate a nexus where he has not 
personally prepared the documents.238 The nexus test does not 
consider that the process of work delegation may create several 
parties with an interest in a document: the person who initiates the 
project, the person who actually prepares the document, and the 
person who has custody of the document. Consistent with the Su­
preme Court's holding in Mancusi v. DeForte, all parties are likely 
to have an expectation of privacy that the document will only be 
shared with those within the workplace who are entitled to 
access.239 
The totality test ignores an important aspect of the employ­
ment relationship by focusing to a large degree on the employee's 
effort to exclude others from access rather than the employee's 
right to exclude.240 An employee's right to exclude is a direct result 
236. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text for the application of this 
criterion. 
237. See United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1993) (considering the 
defendant's position as mayor for nineteen years); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 
306 (1st Cir. 1980) (including the defendants' positions in the firm as specific considera­
tions). But see United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1998) (re­
jecting the lower court's reliance on the defendant's position as a corporate officer and 
the fact that he had a master key as a basis for privacy expectations). 
238. See United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no 
nexus where the sole proprietor of businesses rarely visited the office and was com­
pletely uninvolved in the preparation of the materials); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 
1052, 1055 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that there was no nexus where the president of the 
corporation did not prepare the documents and did not work in the building where the 
documents were stored). 
239. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (noting that DeForte could 
"reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business guests 
would enter the office and that the records would not be touched except with their 
permission or that of union higher-ups.") 
240. This is best exemplified in the Anderson decision, in which the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the lower court's basis for privacy expectations, the defendant's position as a 
corporate officer, and focused on all the steps the defendant took to exclude others 
from the room searched. See Anderson, 154 F.3d at 1233; see also United States v. 
Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's as­
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of the employment relationship, whereas efforts to exclude may not 
be.241 An even more troubling aspect of this focus is that it may 
yield results more consistent with the lesser privacy standard em­
ployed by the courts where the government conducts a search in 
their capacity as employer.242 
Under both the nexus and totality approaches, the courts have 
erroneously focused on the Supreme Court's Mancusi decision as 
standing for the principal that an office is a place in which privacy 
expectations exist, even where it is shared by others.243 By focusing 
on that aspect of Mancusi, the courts have failed to apply its more 
significant recognition that the employment relationship creates a 
privacy expectation in relation to outsiders, not fellow employees 
who were entitled to access or persons given access by those 
employees.244 
serted privacy expectations in his shed in which he ran a business since he failed to lock 
the door or take other measures to exclude others). 
241. For instance, an employee could enter the company president's office in his 
absence, close the curtains, lock the door, and view confidential documents in the presi­
dent's file cabinet. The employee has excluded others through his efforts but has no 
right to do so. 
242. Compare State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 706 (Kan. 1983) (holding under the 
totality approach that the warehouse manager had no privacy expectation where others 
had access to the area searched), with Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 
1994) (finding that under the reasonableness standard, a law clerk had no privacy ex­
pectation in chambers' appurtenances, desks, file cabinets, or other workspaces due to 
the open access of documents between judges and clerks). This may, in part, result 
from the subjectivity inherent in the totality's balancing approach. See generally Na­
dine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales 
Through the Least Intrusive Analysis, 63 N.Y. L. REV. 1173, 1184-1207 (1988) (criticiz­
ing Fourth Amendment balancing tests generally and in particular for their 
subjectivity). 
243. See United States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Mancusi for the principle that one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in one's own 
office); United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing Mancusi for 
the principle that there was a demonstrated nexus between the area searched and De­
Forte's workspace); State v. Worrell, 666 P.2d 703, 706 (Kan. 1983) (citing Mancusi for 
the principle of privacy expectations in one's own office). But see United States v. 
Cardoza-Hinojsa, 140 F.3d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the defendant's reliance 
on the Mancusi principle that access by others does not defeat privacy expectations 
where the defendant could not show a right to exclude others from his unlocked shed). 
244. The Mancusi Court made it clear that DeForte's privacy expectation was 
created in relationship to intrusion by government officials, not with regard to co-work­
ers who were entitled to access through their employment relationship. See Mancusi, 
392 U.S. at 369 (stating that "DeForte could reasonably have expected only those [with 
whom he shared an office] and their personal guests would enter the office, and that 
records would not be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups. 
This expectation was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials ...."); see 
also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) ("The employee's expectation of 
privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom 
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In addition, the short shrift given in both approaches to the 
importance of the employment relationship is inconsistent with the 
courts' willingness to rely on it as a basis for allowing employees to 
consent to searches in the workplace.245 If the employer has con­
ferred upon the employee sufficient rights to allow them to consent 
to a search, she logically has conferred commensurate privacy 
expectations.246 
It is evident that the nexus and totality tests fail to recognize 
the importance of the employment relationship in establishing pri­
vacy expectations. This result is inconsistent with the Mancusi ra­
tionale and the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of 
relationships in determining privacy expectations. Consequently, a 
different approach is needed which accounts for this relationship. 
D. 	 Crafting a Relationship-Based Approach: A Broader Scope of 
Workplace Privacy 
1. 	 The Importance of Expanding the Scope of Workplace 
Privacy 
An employment relationship could be defined either in broad 
or narrow terms, depending on how one views the degree of protec­
tion afforded to an employee under the Fourth Amendment. This 
Note suggests that the relationship should be broadly defined for 
three reasons: the time spent in the workplace, the need for deter­
rence against unwarranted government intrusion upon privacy 
rights, and the implications created by a narrower definition to ar­
eas beyond the traditional workplace. 
Americans view privacy as a fundamental right.247 Conse­
quently, it is important to assure that this right extends to a place in 
which people spend significant amounts of time. While the Fourth 
a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and 
personal invitees."). 
245. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 8.6(c) (noting that "the agency test [for deter­
mining consent of workplace searches] appears to have retained some of its force in the 
employee consent cases because its relevance is more apparent in such a context"). 
246. See Craig M. Bradley, 35 AUG TRIAL 75, 75 (1999) (arguing that the courts 
should treat the right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim and the right to consent to a 
search consistently); Coombs, supra note 209, at 1638-48 (noting the logical connection 
between third party consent and derivative Fourth Amendment claims and explaining 
the basis for third party consent). 
247. See Mayer, supra note 9, at 625 n.1 (1992) (citing a 1990 poll conducted in 
which "79% of Americans agreed that if the Declaration of Independence were re­
written, privacy should be added to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as a 'fun­
damental right' "). 
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Amendment routinely protects a person's privacy in their own 
home, working people are likely to spend more of their waking 
hours at work than at home.248 Recent studies indicate that the 
average workweek has increased in the last twenty years.249 At the 
same time, the average time spent at home has decreased.250 Some 
members of the Supreme Court have noted that with so much time 
spent at work, "the workplace has become another home for most 
working Americans. "251 
Also, broader workplace protections deter the government 
from unlawful and intrusive conduct.252 The Fourth Amendment 
was created to ensure that the government adheres to certain mea­
sures before intruding on citizens' rights.253 With the gaping holes 
left in workplace privacy by the courts, a great incentive is left for 
police to cast a broad net in workplace searches, knowing that the 
courts will limit privacy rights.254 Broad workplace protection cre­
ates a disincentive for police to disregard warrant requirements. 
248. See Estlund, supra note 200, at 8-9 nn.19-22. 
249. See Sabrina Jones, Stretched to Their Limits, News and Observer (Raleigh, 
NC), June 6, 1999, at El (citing a survey by the Families and Work Institute in which 
they found that average work hours increased from 43.6 hours in 1977 to 47.1 in 1997). 
The survey also found that 13% of wage and salaried workers, most of who work full­
time, have a second job. See Families and Work Institute, 1997 National Study of the 
Changing Workforce, http://www.familiesandwork.org. 
250. See Jones, supra note 249 (noting that U[a]s the hours spent on the job have 
risen, time at home has shrunk). The author cites a report by the Council of Economic 
Advisors in which they found that working parents spend only 22 hours per week with 
their children, a 14% decrease in the last three decades. See id. 
251. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 u.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens). 
252. This rationale obviously applies in contexts other than the workplace. See 
Wallace W. Sherwood, Fourth Amendment Standing: Flat On Its Face, 36 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 441, 442 (1988) (stating generally about the Fourth Amendment that a U[n]arrow 
construction of the scope of an individual's rights promotes the government's ability to 
violate the Constitution and impedes the citizenry's ability to curtail such violations 
through court"). 
253. In one of the first cases to discuss the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court expressed concerns over minor encroachments by the government 
that could eventually erode constitutional protections. See Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 635 (1886). The Boyd Court favored strong adherence to warrant require­
ments unless the government established superior property rights. See id. at 623-24. 
See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During The Lochner Era: Privacy, Prop­
erty, And Liberty In Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 573-81 (1996) for an 
excellent discussion of the Boyd case and its significance. 
254. Many scholars have argued that by restricting Fourth Amendment rights and 
thus reducing the need for the exclusionary rule, the Court has failed to provide an 
adequate deterrent mechanism. Sherwood, supra note 252, at 441; Simien, supra note 
86, at 539; Welsh S. White & Robert S. Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and 
Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 348 (1970). 
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Most importantly, there is reason to be concerned that lower 
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expectations in traditionally protected areas, such as the home. The 
Supreme Court recently held that, despite being an invited guest 
into a person's residence, a lower expectation of privacy existed be­
cause the relationship between the homeowner and the defendant 
was of a commercial, rather than personal, nature.255 It is not too 
far a reach to extend this rationale to deny Fourth Amendment 
rights to business guests in one's home for a dinner party or to 
guests at a Tupperware party. 
This rationale is particularly troublesome if one considers the 
increasing numbers of people who work in their homes, whether on 
a full-time or part-time basis.256 It is unclear based on the Court's 
current rationale where or how a line would be drawn to distinguish 
between commercial and personal Fourth Amendment protections. 
Perhaps one standard of privacy rights would be applied in a home 
office and another to the rest of the house. Whichever means may 
be used, they pose troubling privacy concerns. 
This recent decision presents precisely the kind of reasoning 
that the first Supreme Court cautioned against. In Boyd v. United 
States ,257 the Court warned that minor encroachments would erode 
the Amendment's protection.258 To guard against such encroach­
ments, the Court advocated a broad scope of protection.259 
Consequently, many factors weigh in favor of establishing a 
broad definition of the employment relationship. A broader defini­
tion would result in more expansive privacy protections in the 
255. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (finding a lesser expectation of 
privacy on property used for commercial purposes and for a commercial transaction); 
see also United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that in 
Carter, "the Supreme Court effectively heightened the burden for a defendant ... when 
the defendant's presence in the dwelling is for a commercial or business purpose"). In 
Carter, the defendant was given permission by a lessee to use her apartment to package 
cocaine. 525 U.S. at 85-86. The defendant had never been to the apartment prior to the 
incident and had been given use of the apartment in exchange for some drugs. /d. at 86. 
256. See Big Gains in Work at Home, Boomer Report, July 1998, at 4 (citing Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics finding that in 1997, 4.1 million self-employed people worked 
out of their home and 3.6 million workers received some compensation from employers 
for work at home). 
257. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
258. See id. at 635. 
259. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for the Boyd Court's statement on 
the importance of a liberal interpretation of the Amendment in order to prevent 
abuses. See also Cloud, supra note 253, at 576-77 (stating that Boyd's expansive theory 
established the principle that even law enforcement goals could not trump fundamental 
natural rights embodied in the Constitution). 
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workplace. In light of the time most Americans spend at work, the 
importance of deterring unlawful government intrusions, and the 
implications of a narrower definition on areas outside of work­
places, a more expansive scope of protection is warranted. 
2. The Analytical Framework 
The approaches taken by the courts to address the question at 
issue in this Note, whether an employee's privacy rights extend be­
yond their own workspace, provide a fairly narrow scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection.260 This section of the Note suggests an al­
ternative approach which recognizes the importance of the employ­
ment relationship and which is more likely to provide a broader 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. 
Since this Note's concept of the employment relationship is 
predicated on the employer sharing her privacy rights with her em­
ployees, the employer logically could not confer privacy expecta­
tions that she herself does not have. Consequently, just as an 
employer could not assert a Fourth Amendment claim where the 
area searched is open to the public,261 neither could the employee. 
Likewise, since employers in heavily regulated industries have re­
duced expectations of privacy,262 employees in those industries 
would have similarly reduced expectations. 
In analyzing an employee's Fourth Amendment claim, the first 
step should be to define the confines of the workplace.263 This 
means not only setting the boundaries, but also to make distinctions 
260. This is exemplified most clearly in the courts applying the nexus test, in 
which there are no examples of cases where the court found an employee had legitimate 
expectations of privacy outside either their office or office suite. But see United States 
v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing that in 
United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1993), the mayor demonstrated a nexus 
between the attic searched and his office because of the physical relationship between 
the locations and the control the mayor exercised over the area). The Mancini court 
had applied the totality test in analyzing the mayor's claim and, thus, did not directly 
address the nexus criteria. See Mancini, 8 F.3d at 109 (discussing relevant factors). 
261. See supra Part LA.l for a discussion of the effect that the public/private 
distinction has on workplace searches. 
262. See supra Part LA.2 for a discussion of lesser privacy expectations in closely 
regulated industries. 
263. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (noting that "[b]ecause the 
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy [ ] is understood to differ according to the 
context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of the workplace context. The 
workplace includes those areas and items related to work and are generally within the 
employer's control"). 
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between public and private areas within the workplace.264 In keep­
ing with the Mancusi holding, an area should not be deemed public 
simply because limited numbers of non-employees have access 
while accompanied by employees.265 These non-public areas would 
be parts of the workplace in which the employee has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. 
In the typical workplace claim, work-related materials have 
been seized.266 In these cases, the court's inquiry should focus on 
whether the item seized relates in some manner to employee's job 
responsibilities.267 The court's inquiry thus would recognize the in­
terconnected, collaborative nature of work. An employee who del­
egates work to another would no longer lose Fourth Amendment 
protection simply by failing to perform the task herself.268 Like­
wise, the person to whom the work is delegated is protected regard­
less of whether she has the authority to retain the materials in her 
possession.269 
Where a workplace seizure involves the employee's personal 
items, the employer does not have the same privacy interests in the 
item to share with the employee. Similarly, an employee could not 
assume that co-workers would keep others from access. In those 
cases, the employee would need to establish privacy expectations 
264. See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the importance of the public/private 
distinction in workplace searches. 
265. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (noting that DeForte's 
privacy expectations did not change simply because the workers with whom he shared 
an office might allow their personal and business guests into the office). Some doubt 
has been cast on this point by the Court's later decision in Rawlings v. Kentucky. 448 
U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that access by others sufficiently reduced the defendant's pri­
vacy expectation). 
266. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Most cases 
that discuss employee standing involve seizure of work-related documents from the 
workplace. "). 
267. In some cases this would be obvious, but in others the court may look to a 
contract between the parties or could require the employee to produce evidence to 
establish such responsibilities. 
268. This result distinguishes this approach from the nexus test. For example, 
under the nexus test, a president of a company could not assert a Fourth Amendment 
claim when he neither worked in the area searched nor prepared the documents. See 
supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text for an example of this result. Under the 
relationship-based approach, a president of a company would have the right to assert a 
claim where any work-materials were seized. 
269. Professor Mary Coombs, who ascribes to the importance of relationships as 
a basis for Fourth Amendment rights, suggests that once a relationship has been estab­
lished, the government may rebut the presumption that a sufficient relationship exists. 
Coombs, supra note 209, at 1652 (noting that either party would be entitled to present 
such proof). 
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independent from the employer.27o Consistent with the approach 
applied by the First and Tenth Circuit, the employee could do this 
by showing steps taken to exclude others from access to the item.271 
This could be demonstrated through the employee's' presence, 
through objective manifestations to keep others from access, or by 
keeping the item in an area reserved for the employee's exclusive 
use.272 Consistent with the employment relationship rationale, 
however, the employer could rightfully place limits on where the 
employee may keep personal possessions beyond areas reserved for 
the employee's personal use.273 
Using the employment relationship as a basis for analyzing pri­
vacy expectations does not solve all of the questions that the myriad 
of workplace situations may create. Yet, it applies to the vast ma­
jority of contexts and offers a means by which the courts can recog­
nize a broader scope of protection than that which the current 
approaches provide. By recognizing the importance of relation­
ships in creating privacy expectations, the courts may stem the tide 
of eroding Fourth Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace privacy has deep historical roots. In Mancusi v. De­
Forte, the Supn!me Court established that employees may have le­
gitimate privacy expectations in even those areas of the workplace 
that are shared with other employees. Subsequent decisions by the 
Court in non-workplace contexts have raised the question as to 
what extent an employee must be able to exclude others in order to 
be able to assert Fourth Amendment claims beyond their own 
workspace. 
270. This is similar to the rationale the courts have used in requiring corporate 
officers to establish independent privacy expectations from the corporation when the 
corporation's property has been seized. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of that issue. 
271. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the First 
Circuit's approach in United States v. Mancini, and supra Part ILC for a discussion of 
the Tenth Circuit's approach in United States v. Anderson. 
272. The courts have consistently supported an employee's right to assert a claim 
on this basis. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, at § l1.3(d) (stating that "[iJf it is shown that 
the place searched was a desk or similar area set aside for the exclusive use of the 
defendant, then quite clearly the defendant will have standing"). 
273. Absent consent, the employee could not rightly assume that the employer 
would limit access to those that share the employee's interests in her property. See 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990) (noting that a "host may admit or exclude 
from the house as he prefers, but it is unlikely that he will admit someone who wants to 
see or meet with the guest over the objection of the guest."). 
2001] EMPLOYEES' WORK SPACE PRIVACY 235 
Workplaces are unique environments in which individuals 
often work in collaborative relationships to meet shared goals. The 
employment relationship between the employer and employee 
gives rise to legal rights and obligations. For this relationship to 
function properly, an employer expects her employees to protect 
her privacy interests. The employer shares her privacy with the em­
ployee in order to accomplish these goals. 
The two approaches taken by the lower courts, the totality of 
circumstances approach and the nexus test, fail to adequately ac­
count for the importance of this relationship in addressing the ques­
tion of an employee's right to assert a Fourth Amendment claim 
beyond her own workspace. The nexus test fails to take into ac­
count the collaborative nature of workplace relationships. The to­
tality approach relies on an employee's efforts to exclude others, 
rather than the right to exclude given through the employment rela­
tionship. Both approaches fail to recognize the Mancusi decision's 
fundamental principle that an employee need not .demonstrate the 
right to exclude other employees in order to assert a Fourth 
Amendment claim. 
Another approach is needed that recognizes the employment 
relationship in order to create a broader scope of Fourth Amend­
ment protection for employees. This broader scope is necessary 
since employees spend most of their waking hours at work, as in­
creased deterrence against unlawful government action, and to 
stem the tide of eroding Fourth Amendment protection. An ap­
proach that focuses on the employment relationship as a source of 
privacy expectations, while recognizing traditional Fourth Amend­
ment limiting principles, strikes the right balance .. 
Michele Morris 
